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28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of 
this title, the district courts, together 
with the United States District Court for the 
District of the Canal Zone and the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 
claims against the United States, for money 
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 
1945, for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, 
under circumstances where the United States, 
if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the 
place where the act or omission occurred. 
28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(h) 
The provisions of this chapter [28 USCS §§ 
2671 et seq.] and section 1346(b) of this 
title shall not apply to -
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights: . . . 
Idaho Code § 6-903(a) (1990) 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
every governmental entity is subject to 
liability for money damages arising out of 
its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions and those of its employees acting 
within the course and scope of their 
employment or duties, whether arising out of 
a governmental or proprietary function, where 
the governmental entity if a private person 
or entity would be liable for money damages 
under the laws of the state of Idaho, 
provided that the governmental entity is 
subject to liability only for the pro rata 
share of the total damages awarded in favor 
of a claimant which is attributable to the 
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions of the governmental entity or its 
employees. 
Idaho Code § 6-904(3) (1990) 
A governmental entity and its employees while 
acting within the course and scope of their 
employment and without malice or criminal 
intent shall not be liable for any claim 
which: 
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights. 
New Mexico Statutes Ann. § 41-4-12 (Mitchie 1989) 
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A 
of Section 41-4-4 NMSA 1978 does not apply to 
liability for personal injury, bodily injury, 
wrongful death of property damage resulting 
from assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, defamation of 
character, violation of property rights or 
deprivation of any rights, privileges or 
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immunities secured by the constitution and 
laws of the United States or New Mexico when 
caused by law enforcement officers while 
acting within the scope of their duties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff concedes that the action in question was a 
governmental function, and that he claims immunity was waived by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990). Plaintiff admits that the 
injuries in question arose from an assault and battery. Mr. 
Petersen then seeks to avoid the applicable exception to waiver 
of immunity by claiming that allegations of negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention of a government employee are not 
subject to the exceptions to waiver of immunity as are all other 
negligence claims. 
All claims of negligence by a governmental employee against 
a governmental entity are subject to the exceptions to waiver of 
immunity found in the statute. A claim of negligent hiring and 
supervision is no different from any other negligence action. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Idaho and Federal law is misplaced. 
Both the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts include waivers of 
immunity for negligence and all other wrongful acts. Unlike 
Utah, these statutes waived immunity for intentional torts. Both 
the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts then contain exceptions to 
their general waivers of immunity, including an exception for 
claims arising out of assault and battery. 
Utah's exception for injuries arising out of assault and 
battery is inherently different. Because Utah did not waive 
immunity for intentional torts, this exception could not 
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reasonably be interpreted as merely retaining immunity for such 
torts. The exception can only be reasonably interpreted as 
retaining immunity for the negligent acts of governmental 
employees that proximately cause another to suffer injury arising 
out of an assault and battery. 
Given this clear retention of immunity for injuries arising 
out of assault and battery, the trial court erred when it denied 
the Board of Education's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS OF 
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
ARE SUBJECT TO THE RETENTION OF IMMUNITY FOR 
INJURIES ARISING OUT OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
In his appellee's brief, Mr. Petersen expressly concedes 
that the challenged conduct of the Board of Education of Davis 
County School District is clearly a governmental function. 
Appellee's Brief at page 6. 
As to the second step, of determining whether there has been 
a waiver of immunity, the plaintiff relies upon the waiver of 
immunity for the negligent acts or omissions of government 
employees found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990). 
The final step is to determine whether there are any 
applicable exceptions to the specific waiver of immunity. But 
having reached this point, plaintiff then claims that the 
exceptions to said waiver, found in the same statute, are somehow 
not applicable to his claims. 
But the waiver of immunity for the negligence of a 
4 
government employee is subject to numerous exceptions. One of 
those exceptions retains the Board of Education's immunity for 
the negligence of its employees "if the injury arises out of: 
assault, battery." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990). 
Plaintiff, without benefit of any statutory authority, 
claims that allegations of negligent hiring, retention, or 
supervision of a governmental employee are not subject to the 
exceptions to waiver of immunity as are all other negligence 
claims. Mr. Petersen relies upon this Court's decision in 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) for this 
proposition. 
Birkner involved negligence actions against an employee of 
the county, and against the county. The negligence alleged 
against the county was its claimed failure to properly supervise 
its employee. This Court held that the county could be found 
liable for negligent hiring and supervision of an employee. In 
explaining its decision, this Court stated: 
Section 63-30-10 permits an action against 
the state and its political subdivisions for 
negligent acts or omissions of employees 
committed within the scope of employment, 
with some exceptions not relevant here. 
771 P.2d at 1059, emphasis added, footnote omitted. In a 
footnote to this statement the Court stated: 
Section 63-30-10(1) provides that "immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment" 
unless certain specified exceptions are 
applicable. 
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771 P.2d at 1059, n. 4. The injuries at question in Birkner did 
not arise from an assault or battery. They did not arise out 
incarceration, the issuance of a license, false arrest, false 
imprisonment, or any of the other specified exceptions to waiver 
of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990). For that 
reason, the county in Birkner could be held liable for its 
negligent hiring and supervision of an employee. 
But Mr. Petersen's injuries in the present action are 
affirmatively pled to have been caused by an assault and battery. 
Because this is so, the specified exception for injuries arising 
out of assault and battery applies and the immunity of the Board 
of Education has not been waived. 
Plaintiff seems to argue that the retention of immunity for 
injuries arising out of assault and battery should be construed 
so as to apply only to retention of immunity from allegations of 
assault and battery. 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute would make Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990) meaningless. Almost all of the 
torts listed in this section are intentional torts, such as 
assault and battery. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et 
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts 
(such as assault and battery) committed by government employees. 
Alema Teo has been named as a party to this action and recovery 
can be had from him if he is found to have performed the 
intentional torts of assault and battery. 
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Because section 10 of the Governmental Immunity Act only 
deals with negligent acts and omissions, there would be no need 
for it to retain immunity for intentional torts. Mr. Petersen 
asks this Court to interpret subsection 2 to be an exception to 
waiver of immunity for which there had been no waiver of immunity 
in the first place. This is contrary to the Court's "fundamental 
duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute." 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252, n. 11 (Utah 1988). 
Instead, the meaning of the statute is clear. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 waives immunity for injuries proximately caused 
by the negligent acts or omissions of government employees. But 
this waiver is not absolute. Numerous exceptions to this waiver 
are listed in the statute. The salient question is out of what 
act the complained of injuries arose, not what the particular 
negligence of the government employee may be. 
The particular act of negligence that a plaintiff may allege 
is not determinative of whether or not governmental immunity has 
been waived. The Court must look instead out of what action the 
claimed injury arises. If the injury arises out of one of the 
specific exceptions, then immunity has been retained. 
That is how this Court interpreted the statute in question 
in Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
Maddocks held that the retention of immunity for injuries arising 
out of assault and battery applied to the plaintiff's claim that 
three city employees had negligently failed to intervene and 
protect the plaintiff from the assault and battery committed by 
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their fellow employee. 
Plaintiff's phrasing of the claim against 
Salt Lake City as one for negligence does not 
bring it within the category of claims for 
which immunity is waived. 
Id. at 1340. The instant action cannot be distinguished from 
Maddocks. All of the injuries claimed by Petersen arise out of 
the alleged assault and battery. For this reason the Board of 
Education's immunity has not been waived regardless of the 
particular negligence plaintiff might allege. 
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish this Court's decision in 
Connell v. Tooele City. 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), as well as the 
other Utah cases cited by the Board of Education, on the basis 
that they do not involve claims of negligent hiring, training, 
retaining, or supervising of government employees. 
Defendant Board of Education is at a loss to understand how 
these negligence claims differ from any and all other claims of 
negligence. Certainly the statutes of Utah do not make such a 
distinction. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990), applies to all 
claims of negligence, including those raised in the instant 
action. 
Plaintiff also asks this Court to judicially amend the 
Governmental Immunity Act so as to waive immunity in the instant 
case as a matter of public policy.1 Mr. Petersen has not, at any 
time, challenged the constitutionality of the Governmental 
1
 In support of this effort, plaintiff relies upon three press 
clippings concerning school aged children that were never submitted 
to the trial court, are not part of the record, and are irrelevant 
and immaterial. 
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Immunity Act. He simply urges the Court to interpret contrary to 
its unambiguous language because he claims that the act, as 
enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah, is not sound 
public policy. 
While this Court has complete authority to interpret the 
laws enacted by the legislature, and total authority to determine 
whether such laws are constitutional, it is not this Court's 
function to pass on the propriety, correctness, or soundness of 
the laws passed by the legislature. 
It is not the function of this Court to 
evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of 
legislative enactments. It is the power and 
responsibility of the Legislature to enact 
laws to promote the public health, safety, 
morals and general welfare of society, and 
this Court will not substitute our judgment 
for that of the Legislature with respect to 
what best serves the public interest. The 
adjustment and accommodation of conflicting 
interests, such as are involved in this case, 
are for the Legislature to resolve, 
irrespective of the rules applied by other 
states. 
Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted); see also. Ketchum. Konkel. et al. v. Heritage Mt.. 784 
P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah App. 1989). 
Plaintiff's claimed injuries all arose out of the alleged 
assault and battery committed by Alema Teo. The Utah State 
Legislature has determined that sovereign immunity should not be 
waived for injuries arising out of assaults and batteries. For 
this reason, the Board of Education is entitled to governmental 
immunity and the trial court erred in not granting the Board's 
motion to dismiss. 
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II. FEDERAL, IDAHO, AND NEW MEXICO STATUTES 
ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARE NOT IDENTICAL TO 
THOSE OF UTAH AND THE CASE LAW OF THESE 
JURISDICTIONS IS NOT USEFUL IN INTERPRETING 
THE MEANING OF UTAH'S STATUTE 
Plaintiff relies on case law from the state of New Mexico 
and Idaho, and upon federal case law. Plaintiff incorrectly 
claims that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned 
after the Federal Tort Claims Act. While parts of the Utah law 
are similar to parts of the Federal act, the entire structure of 
the two laws is different. 
While this Court has looked to federal precedent in 
determining how to interpret the phrase "discretionary function,f! 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1983), a brief review of the two acts makes it clear that they 
are not identical, or even very similar. Even assuming that Utah 
borrowed from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the material changes 
that Utah has made to the act, and the different setting it has 
given to its provisions, indicate that federal judicial 
interpretations of the federal act are not applicable to the Utah 
act. The same can be said for New Mexico and Idaho. 
In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984), this Court explained: 
We recognize that when the Legislature adopts 
a statute from another state, the presumption 
is that the Legislature is familiar with that 
state's judicial interpretations of that 
statute and intends to adopt them also. 
However, that canon of statutory construction 
is not a hard and fast principle; it is 
subject to a number of exceptions, several of 
which are directly applicable in the instant 
case. In the first place, it is not 
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applicable where there have been material 
changes made in the second statute. 
Secondly, the above-stated rule of statutory 
construction is subject to the exception that 
if the borrowed statute is "given a different 
setting in the adopting state" the 
construction placed upon the statute in the 
originating state need not be followed. 
679 P.2d at 904-5 (citations omitted). A review of the immunity 
statutes at question in the cases cited by the plaintiff quickly 
demonstrates that those foreign statutes are not similar, let 
alone identical, to the applicable statutes of Utah. 
The New Mexico statute being considered in Ortiz v. New 
Mexico State Police, 814 P.2d 117 (N.M.App. 1991) did not retain 
immunity for assault and battery. New Mexico Statutes Ann. § 41-
4-12 (Mitchie 1989) expressly waives immunity for injuries 
resulting from an assault or battery caused by New Mexico law 
enforcement officers. 
Both the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts contain general 
waivers of immunity not only for negligent acts of their 
employees, but also for any other wrongful acts. Under Idaho and 
Federal law, the government is liable to the same extent a 
private person would be. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and Idaho Code § 
6-903(a) (1990). 
To the contrary, Utah's laws retain immunity generally. 
Utah then provides certain limited waivers of immunity, including 
a partial waiver of immunity for the negligent acts or omissions 
of government employees. 
Having waived immunity generally, the Idaho and Federal 
statutes then provide an exception to that waiver for intentional 
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torts, such as assault and battery. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), and 
Idaho Code § 6-904(3). 
Utah's statutes do not waive sovereign immunity for 
intentional torts or other wrongful acts, as do the Idaho and 
Federal laws. Instead, Utah's waiver of immunity for injury 
proximately caused by an employee's negligence provides for an 
exception to that waiver if the injury arises out of an assault 
and battery. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990). 
The material differences between the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act are further 
demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Sheridan v. U.S. . 487 U.S. 392, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (1989). Sheridan 
held that the federal retention of immunity for claims arising 
out of assault and battery only provides immunity against claims 
for the intentional torts of government employees. The Court 
held that the United States was not immune from claims of 
independent negligence by other government employees even when 
the injury arose from the assault and battery committed by a 
government employee. 
If Utah were to adopt the federal interpretation of the 
Federal Torts Claim Act, the Utah statutory provision in question 
would become a nullity. Utah has never waived its immunity from 
suit for intentional torts, as the United States did. Section 
63-30-10 only speaks to negligence actions. 
In Grant v. City of Twin Falls. 120 Idaho 69, 813 P.2d 880 
(Idaho 1991), the Supreme Court of Idaho explained the operation 
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of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
The Act is structured in three tiers: The 
general rule is that governmental entities 
are liable for damages arising out of their 
own negligent or otherwise wrongful acts and 
for those of their employees who were acting 
within the course and scope of their 
employment. Section 6-904 then sets out 
certain exceptions to liability, including, 
relevant to the present discussion, an 
exception for acts such as battery and false 
imprisonment commonly known as intentional 
torts. 
120 Idaho at 76-77. Unlike Utah, Idaho's exception applies only 
to the intentional torts themselves and is not part of a statute 
dealing with the waiver of immunity for negligence, and 
exceptions thereto. 
If the retention of immunity for injuries arising out of 
assault and battery is to have any meaning, it must mean that 
government entities cannot be sued for the negligence of their 
employees that proximately causes another to suffer an injury 
arising out of an assault or battery. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying the Board of Education of 
Davis County School District's motion to dismiss. The Board is 
entitled to governmental immunity because the challenged injury 
arises out of assault and battery, for which immunity has been 
retained. For these reasons Defendant-Appellant Board of 
Education asks this Court to reverse the trial court and order 
this action dismissed with prejudice as it relates to this 
Defendant. 
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Respectfully submitted this 3) day of August, 1992 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
^J A 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Board of Education 
of Davis County School District 
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